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Abstract
With advancements of deep learning techniques, it is
now possible to generate super-realistic fake images and
videos. These manipulated forgeries could reach mass
audience and result in adverse impacts on our society.
Although lots of efforts have been devoted to detect forg-
eries, their performance drops significantly on previously
unseen but related manipulations and the detection gen-
eralization capability remains a problem. To bridge this
gap, in this paper we propose Locality-aware AutoEn-
coder (LAE), which combines fine-grained representa-
tion learning and enforcing locality in a unified frame-
work. In the training process, we use pixel-wise mask
to regularize local interpretation of LAE to enforce the
model to learn intrinsic representation from the forgery
region, instead of capturing artifacts in the training set
and learning spurious correlations to perform detection.
We further propose an active learning framework to se-
lect the challenging candidates for labeling, to reduce
the annotation efforts to regularize interpretations. Ex-
perimental results indicate that LAE indeed could focus
on the forgery regions to make decisions. The results
further show that LAE achieves superior generalization
performance compared to state-of-the-arts on forgeries
generated by alternative manipulation methods.
Introduction
With current advancement of deep learning and computer vi-
sion techniques, e.g., generative adversarial networks (GAN),
it is possible to generate super-realistic fake images and
videos. These techniques enable an attacker to manipulate
an image/video by swapping its content with alternative con-
tents and synthesize a new image/video. For instance, Deep-
Fake and FaceSwap could generate manipulated videos about
real people performing fictional things, where even human
eyes have difficulties distinguishing these forgeries from real
ones (DeepFake 2019; Faceswap 2019). The forgery images
and videos could be further shared on social media for mali-
cious purposes, such as spreading fake news about celebrities,
influencing elections or manipulating stock prices, thus might
cause serious negative impact on our society (Cozzolino et al.
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2018). To help mitigate their adverse effects, it is essential
that we develop methods to detect the manipulated forgeries.
Current manipulated forgery detection approaches roughly
fall into two branches: CNN based methods and artifacts
based methods. Methods of the first category are usually for-
mulated into a binary classification problem. Those methods
take either the whole or partial image as input and then clas-
sify it as fake or not by designing diverse architectures of con-
volutional networks (Nguyen, Yamagishi, and Echizen 2019;
Nguyen et al. 2018; Afchar et al. 2018). The second cate-
gory relies on hypothesis on artifacts or inconsistencies of a
video or image, such as lack of realistic eye blinking (Li et al.
2018), face warping artifacts (Li and Lyu 2019), and lacking
self-consistency (Huh et al. 2018).
Despite abundant efforts have been devoted to forensics,
it remains a challenging problem to develop detection meth-
ods which are readily applied in real world applications.
The main challenge lies in the limited generalization capa-
bility on previously unseen forgeries. Firstly, as evidenced
by recent work (Cozzolino et al. 2018; Khodabakhsh et al.
2018), although detection accuracy of current methods on
hold-out test set could reach 99% for most tasks, the ac-
curacy drops to around 50% on previously unseen forgery
images/videos. Secondly, in our preliminary experiments
we have observed that these models fail to focus on the
forgery regions to make detection, leveraging heatmaps
by local interpretation methods (Selvaraju et al. 2017;
Zhou et al. 2016). Instead, they have concentrated on non-
forgery parts, and learn spurious correlations to separate true
and fake images. Due to the independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) training-test split of data, these spurious pat-
terns happen to be predictive on hold-out test set. In contrast,
forgeries generated by alternative methods may not contain
these spurious correlations. This can possibly explain their
high accuracy on hold-out test set and low accuracy on alter-
native test set. Thirdly, to some extent these methods “have
solved” the training dataset, but it is still too far away from
really solving the forgery detection problem. As new types
of forgery manipulations emerge quickly, unfortunately the
forensic methods without sufficient generalization capability
cannot be readily applied to real world data (Xuan et al. 2019;
Khodabakhsh et al. 2018).
To bridge the generalization gap, we propose to explore
two distinct characteristics of the manipulated forgeries: fine-
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grained nature and spatial locality. Firstly, forgery detection
is a fine-grained classification task. The difference between
true and fake images are so subtle, even human eyes are
hard to distinguish them. Secondly, forgery occupies a cer-
tain ratio of the whole image input. For instance, DeepFake
videos (DeepFake 2019) use GAN-based technology to re-
place one’s face with anther’s. This manipulation changes
human faces, while leaving the background part unchanged.
Considering these two properties, a desirable detection model
should be able to concentrate on the forgery region to learn
effective representations. As such, the detection model needs
to possess local interpretability, which indicates which region
is attended by the model to make decisions (Du, Liu, and Hu
2019). The benefit is that we can control the local interpre-
tation explicitly by imposing extra supervision on instance
interpretation in the learning process, in order to enforce the
model to focus on the forgery region to learn representations.
In this work, based on aforementioned observations, we
introduce Locality-aware AutoEncoder (LAE) for better gen-
eralization of forgery detection. LAE considers both fine-
grained representation learning and enforcing locality in a
single framework for image forensics. To guarantee fine-
grained representation learning, our work builds upon an
autoencoder, which employs reconstruction losses and latent
space loss for capturing the distribution for the trained images.
To guard against spurious correlations learned by the autoen-
coder, we augment local interpretability to the antoencoder
and use extra pixel-wise forgery ground truth to regularize
the local interpretation. As such, the LAE is enforced to cap-
ture discriminative representations from the forgery region.
We further employ an active learning framework to reduce
the efforts to create pixel-wise forgery masks. We evaluate
and compare our approach with existing methods on three
challenging forgery detection tasks. Our proposed model not
only achieves state-of-the-art generalization performance on
all tasks, but also shows improved interpretability. The major
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a manipulated forgery detection method,
called LAE, which makes predictions relying on correct
evidence in order to boost generalization accuracy.
• We present an active learning framework to reduce the
annotation efforts, where less than 1% annotations are
needed to regularize LAE during training.
• Experimental results on three forgery detection tasks vali-
date that LAE could achieve high generalization accuracy
on previously unseen forgeries generated by alternative
manipulation methods.
Problem Statement
In this section, we first introduce the basic notations used in
this paper. Then we present the generalizable forgery detec-
tion problem that we target to tackle.
Notations: Given a source dataset D containing both true im-
ages XT and fake images XF generated by a forgery method.
D is split into training set Dtrn = {(xi, li)}Ni=1, validation
set Dval = {(xi, li)}Nvali=1 and test set Dtst = {(xi, li)}Ntsti=1,
where li ∈ [0, 1] denotes fake and true class label respec-
tively. A detection model f(x) is learned from the training set
Dtrn. Beyond the source set D, there is also a target dataset
Dtgt = {(xi, li)}Ntgti=1, which is used to test the generaliza-
tion ability of model f(x) on unseen forgery manipulations.
Fake images in Dtgt and in D belong to the same kind of
forgery task, while are not generated by the same forgery
methods. For example in the DeepFake-alike human face
manipulation detection task, D contains forgery images cre-
ated by FaceSwap (Faceswap 2019), while fake images in
Dtgt are created by an alternative forgery method, such as
Face2Face (Thies et al. 2016). Besides, the target dataset Dtgt
only serves the testing purpose, and none of its images are
used to train the model or tune hyperparameters.
Generalizable Forgery Detection: Our objective is to train a
model, which could generalize well for forgeries generated by
other methods, as long as they are for the same detection task.
For instance, for the face manipulation detection task, we
expect the model trained on FaceSwap is able to generalize to
alternative manipulation methods, such as Face2Face. This is
significant in the real-world scanerio, since new manipulation
methods may emerge day by day, and retraining the detector
is difficult and even impractical due to the lack of sufficient
labeled data from the new manipulation methods.
Autoencoder for Forgery Detection
In this section, we introduce the autoencoder model for ma-
nipulated forgery detection. A key characteristic of forgery
detection lies in its fine-grained nature. Thus effective repre-
sentation is needed for both true and fake images in order to
ensure high detection accuracy. As such, we use an autoen-
coder to learn more distinguishable representations which
could separate true and fake images in the latent space.
The autoencoder is denoted using f , which consists a sub-
network encoder fe(·) and decoder fd(·). This encoder maps
the input image x ∈ Rw×h×3 to the low-dimensional latent
vector space encoding z ∈ Rdz , where dz is the dimension
of latent vector z. Then the decoder remaps latent vector z
back to the input space xˆ ∈ Rw×h×3.
z = fe(x, θe), xˆ = fd(z, θd), (1)
where θe and θd are parameters for the encoder and decoder
respectively. To enforce our model to learn more meaningful
and intrinsic features, we introduce the latent space loss as
well as reconstruction loss.
L1(θe, θd, x, l) = α1Lrec + α2Llatent. (2)
These two losses will be elaborated in following sections.
Latent Space Loss
We make use of the latent space representation to distin-
guish the forgery images from the true ones. The latent
space vector is first split into two parts: T = {1, ..., dz2 },
and F = {dz+22 , ..., dz}. The total activation of xi for the
true and fake category respectively is denoted as:
ai,T =
2
dz
||zi,c||1, c ∈ T ; ai,F = 2
dz
||zi,c||1, c ∈ F. (3)
The final latent space loss is defined as follows:
Llatent =
∑
i
|ai,T − li|+ |ai,F − (1− li)|, (4)
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Figure 1: Schematic of LAE training for generalizable forgery detection. Latent space and reconstruction losses to learn effective representation;
extra supervision to regularize heatmap to boost generalization accuracy; active learning to reduce forgery masks annotation efforts.
where li is the ground truth of input image xi. The key
idea of this loss is to enforce the activation of the true
part: {zi,c}, c ∈ T to be maximally activated if the input
xi is a true image, and similarly to increase the fake part
{zi,c}, c ∈ F activation values for fake image inputs. At
testing stage, the forgery detection is based on the activation
value of the latent space partitions. The input image xi is
considered to be true if ai,T > ai,F , and vice versa.
Reconstruction Loss
To force the fake and true images more distinguishable in the
latent space, it is essential to learn effective representations.
Specifically, we use reconstruction loss which contains three
parts: pixel-wise loss, perceptual loss, and adversarial loss,
to learn intrinsic representation for all training samples. The
overall reconstruction loss Lrec is defined as follows:∑
i
β1 ||xi − xˆi||22︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pixel Loss
+β2 ||C(xi)− C(xˆi)||22︸ ︷︷ ︸
Perceptual Loss
+β3 [−log(D(xˆi))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adversarial Loss
.
(5)
The pixel-wise loss is measured using mean absolute error
(MAE) between original input image pixels and reconstructed
image pixels. For perceptual loss, a pretrained comparator
C(·) (e.g., VGGNet (Simonyan and Zisserman 2015)) is used
to map input image to feature space:Rw×h×3 → Rw1×h1×d1 .
Then MAE difference at the feature space is calculated, which
represents high-level semantic difference of xi and xˆi. In
terms of adversarial loss, a discriminator D(·) is introduced
aiming to discriminate the generated images xˆi from real
ones xi. This subnetwork D(·) is the standard discriminator
network introduced in DCGAN (Radford, Metz, and Chintala
2016), and is trained concurrently with our autoencoder. The
autoencoder is trained to trick the discriminator network into
classifying the generated images as real. The discriminator
D is trained using the following objective:
LD = −[Ex∼PX [logD(x)] + Ex∼PX [log(1−D(xˆ))]].
(6)
Parameter β1, β2, β3 are employed to adjust the impact of
invidual losses. The three losses serve the purpose of ensur-
ing reconstructed image to: 1) be sound in pixel space, 2) be
reliable in the high-level feature space, and 3) look realistic
respectively. The implicit effect is to force the vector z to
learn intrinsic representation which could make it better sepa-
rate fake and true images. Besides, using three losses instead
of using only pixel-wise loss could help stabilize the training
in less number of epoches (Dosovitskiy and Brox 2016).
Locality-aware AutoEncoder (LAE)
The key idea of LAE is that the model should focus on correct
regions and exploit reasonable evidences rather than capture
biases within dataset to make predictions. Due to the pure
data-driven training paradigm, the autoencoder developed in
last section is not guaranteed to focus on the forgery region
to make predictions. Instead the autoencoder may capture
certain spurious correlations which happen to be predictive
in the current dataset. This would lead to decreased general-
ization performance on unseen data generated by alternative
forgery methods. In LAE (as illustrated in Fig. 1), we explic-
itly enforce the model to rely on the forgery region to make
detection predictions, by augmenting the model with local
interpretability and regularizing the interpretation with extra
supervision. Besides, we design an active leaning framework
to select the challenging candidates for regularizing LAE.
Augmenting Local Interpretability
The goal of local interpretation is to identify the contributions
of each pixel in the input image towards a specific model
prediction (Du et al. 2018). The interpretation is illustrated
in the format of heatmap (or attention map). Inspired by
the CNN local interpretation method Class Activation Map
(CAM) (Zhou et al. 2016), we use global average pooling
(GAP) layer as ingredient in the encoder, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. This enables the encoder to output attention map for
each input. Let l-layer denotes the last convolutional layer of
the encoder, and fl,k(xi) represents the activation matrix at k-
channel of l-layer for input image xi. Let alsowck corresponds
to the weight of k-channel towards the unit c of latent vector
z. The CAM attention map for unit c is defined as follows:
Mc(xi) =
dl∑
k=1
wck · fl,k(xi). (7)
Later we upsample Mc(xi) to the same dimension as the
input image xi using bilinear interpolation. Each entry within
Mc(xi) directly indicates the importance of the value at that
spatial grid of image xi leading to the activation zc. The final
attention map Mˆ(xi) for an input image xi is denoted as:
Mˆ(xi) =
dF∑
c=1
|zi,c| ·Mc(xi) =
dF∑
c=1
dl∑
k=1
|zi,c| ·wck · fl,k(xi), (8)
where zi,c denotes the c-th unit of the latent vector z for xi.
Regularizing Local Interpretation
To enforce the network to focus on the correct forgery region
to make detection, a straightforward way is to use instance-
level forgery ground truth to regularize the local interpreta-
tion. Specifically the regularization is achieved by minimiz-
ing the distance between individual interpretation map Mˆ(xi)
and the extra supervision for all the NF forgery images. The
attention loss is defined as follows:
Lattention(θe, x,G) =
NF∑
i=1
[Mˆ(xi)−G(xi)]2, (9)
where G(xi) denotes extra supervision, which is annotated
ground truth for forgery. This ground truth is given in the
format of pixel-wise binary segmentation mask (see Fig. 1
for an illustrative example). The attention loss is end-to-end
trainable and can be utilized to update the model parameters.
Ultimately the trained model could focus on the manipulated
regions to make decisions.
Active Learning to Regularize Local Interpretation
However, generating pixel-wise segmentation masks is ex-
tremely time consuming, especially if we plan to label all
NF forgery images within a dataset. We are interested in em-
ploying only a small ratio of data with extra supervision. In
this section, we propose an active learning framework to se-
lect challenging candidates for annotation. We will describe
below how the active learning works in three steps.
Channels concept ranking. Due to the hierarchical struc-
ture of encoder, the last convolutional layer has larger pos-
sibility to capture high-level semantic concepts. In our case,
we have 512 channels at this layer. A desirable detector could
possess some channels which are responsive to specific and
semantically meaningful natural part (e.g., face, mouth, or
eye), while other channels may capture concepts related to
forgery, (e.g., warping artifacts, or contextual inconsistency).
Nevertheless, in practice the detector may rely on some spu-
rious patterns which only exist in the training set to make
forgery predictions. Those samples leading to this concept
are considered as the most challenging case, since they cause
the model to overfit to dataset specific bias and artifacts.
We intend to select out a subset of channels in the last con-
volutional layer deemed as most influential to the forgery clas-
sification decision. The contribution of a channel towards a
decision is defined as the channel’s average activation scores
for an image. Specifically, the contribution of channel k to-
wards image xi is denoted as: {ui,k}dck=1, where dc is the
number of channels. We learn a linear model based on the
dc concepts to predict the possibility of image xi to be fake:
p(ui) =
exp(w·ui)
1+exp(w·ui) . The loss function is defined as:
Lw =
∑
i=1
[li · log(p(ui)) + (1− li) · log(1− p(ui))]. (10)
After this training, we select 10 highest components of the
optimized linear weight vectorw and the corresponding chan-
nels are considered as more relevant to the forgery decision.
Active candidate selection. After locating the most possi-
ble channels corresponding to the forgery prediction, we feed
Algorithm 1: Locality-aware AutoEncoder (LAE).
Input: Training data D = {(xi, li)}Ni=1.
1 Set hyperparameters α1, α2, β1, β2, β3, λ1, λ2, learning rate η,
iteration number max iter1,max iter2, epoch index t = 0;
2 Initialize autoencoder parameters θe, θd;
3 while t ≤ max iter1 do
4 L1(θe, θd, x, l) = α1Lrec + α2Llatent;
5 θe,t+1, θd,t+1 = Adam(L1(θe, θd, x, l), η);
6 t = t+ 1;
7 Reduce the learning rate: η ← η
10
, t← 0;
8 while t ≤ max iter2 do
9 Lw =∑i=1[li · log(p(ui)) + (1− li) · log(1− p(ui))];
10 Select out Nactive images as active candidates;
11 Request labeling pixel-wise masks {G(xi)}Nactivei=1 ;
12 Lattention(θe, x,G) =∑Nactivei=1 [Mˆ(xi)−G(xi)]2;
13 L2(θe, x, l, G) = λ1Llatent + λ2Lattention;
14 θe,t+1 = Adam(L2(θe, x, l, G), η);
15 t = t+ 1; η ← η
10
if t% 3 = 0;
Output: LAE makes right predictions based on right reasons.
all the NF fake images to the LAE model. Those who have
highest activation value for these top 10 channels are deemed
as the challenging case. The key idea for this choice is that
these highest activation images are mostly likely to contain
easy patterns which can be captured by the model to separate
true and fake images, and which are hard to be generalized
beyond training and hold-out test set. Thus we would like
to request their pixel-wise forgery masks and followed by
regularizing them. Based on this criteria, we select out Nactive
images as active candidates. The candidates number Nactive
is less than 1% of total images and is empirically shown sig-
nificant improvement on generalization accuracy. Comparing
to the number of total training samples which is larger than
10k, we have dramatically reduced the labelling efforts.
Local interpretation loss. Equipped with the active image
candidates, we request labeling those images for pixel-wise
forgery masks {G(xi)}Nactivei=1 . The attention loss is calculated
using the distance between interpretation map and annotated
forgery mask for allNactive candidate images, which is further
combined with latent space loss to update model parameters.
Lattention(θe, x,G) =
Nactive∑
i=1
[Mˆ(xi)−G(xi)]2,
L2(θe, x, l, G) = λ1Llatent + λ2Lattention
(11)
The overall learning algorithm of LAE is presented in Al-
gorithm 1. We apply a two-stage optimization to derive a
generalizable forgery detector. In the first stage, we use L1
loss in Eq.(2) to learn an effective representation. In the sec-
ond stage, we need the model to focus on forgery regions to
learn better representations. So we exploit the active learning
framework to select out challenging candidates to get their
pixel-wise forgery masks. Then we reduce the learning rate
one-tenth every 3 epoches and fine-tune the parameters of the
encoder using the L2 loss in Eq.(11). After training the model
and during the testing stage, we use latent space activation in
Eq.(3) to distinguish forgery from true ones. The test images
are considered to be true if ai,T > ai,F , and vice versa.
Table 1: Dataset statistics for three tasks: face manipulation, at-
tribute modification, and inpainting.
Face Attribute Inpainting
Face2face FaceSwap StarGAN Glow G&L ContextAtten
Train 288000 - 41590 - 28000 -
Validation 2800 - 11952 - 6000 -
Test 2800 2800 5982 5982 6000 6000
Experiments
We conduct experiments to answer the following research
questions. (1) Does LAE promote the generalization accu-
racy when processing unseen instances, especially for those
produced by alternative methods? (2) Does LAE provide
better attention maps after augmenting extra supervision in
the training process? (3) How do different components and
hyperparameters affect the performance of LAE?
Experimental Setup
In this section, we introduce the overall experimental setups,
including tasks, datasets, baseline methods, networks archi-
tectures and implementation details.
Tasks and datasets. The overall empirical evaluation is per-
formed on three types of forgery detection tasks. For each
task, we use two datasets: source dataset and target dataset.
The source dataset is split into training, validation and test set,
which are used to train the model, tune the hyperparameters
and test the model accuracy respectively. In contrast, target
dataset contains forgery images generated by an alternative
method, and is only utilized to assess the true generalization
ability of the detection models. Corresponding dataset statis-
tics are given in Tab. 1. All subsets of the three tasks are
balanced, where the ratio of true and fake images are 1:1.
• DeepFake-alike Faces Manipulation This task ex-
plores human face manipulations, where face of a person
is swapped by face of another person in the video. We
use videos from Faceforensics++ (Rossler et al. 2019).
The source dataset is generated using graphics-based
manipulation method Face2Face (Thies et al. 2016),
while the target one is obtained via manipulation method
FaceSwap (Faceswap 2019). The videos are compressed
using H.2641 with quantization parameter set to 23. There
are 1000 videos for each of real, source, target datasets.
Each dataset is split into 720, 140, 140 for training, valida-
tion and testing respectively. Finally, we use 200 frames
per video for training and 10 frames per video for testing.
• GAN-based Attribute Modification In this task, we test
the detection of GAN-based attribute modification im-
ages (Cozzolino et al. 2018). Real images from CelebA
dataset (Liu et al. 2015) are modified with two methods:
StarGAN (Choi et al. 2018) and Glow (Kingma and Dhari-
wal 2018), which are chosen to be source and target dataset
respectively. All images are 256×256 pixels. The modified
attributes include changing hair color, changing smile, etc.
• Inpainting-based Manipulation It is also referred as
image completion. In this task we consider two inpainting
1https://www.h264encoder.com/
Table 2: Network architecture and output shapes.
Encoder layer Output shape Decoder layer Output shape
Conv2d [64, 128,128] ConvTranspose2d [256, 4,4]
Relu [64, 128,128] BatchNorm2d & Relu [256, 4,4]
Conv2d [128,64,64] ConvTranspose2d [128, 8,8]
BatchNorm2d [128,64,64] BatchNorm2d & Relu [128, 8,8]
Relu [128,64,64] ConvTranspose2d [64, 16,16]
Conv2d [256,32,32] BatchNorm2d & Relu [64, 16,16]
BatchNorm2d [256,32,32] ConvTranspose2d [32, 32,32]
Relu [256,32,32] BatchNorm2d & Relu [32, 32,32]
Conv2d [512,16,16] ConvTranspose2d [16, 64,64]
BatchNorm2d [512,16,16] BatchNorm2d & Relu [16, 64,64]
Relu [512,16,16] ConvTranspose2d [8, 128,128]
Conv2d [512,16,16] BatchNorm2d & Relu [8, 128,128]
Relu [512,16,16] ConvTranspose2d [3, 256,256]
AvgPool2d [512,1,1] Tanh [3, 256,256]
Linear [128]
methods, G&L (Iizuka, Simo-Serra, and Ishikawa 2017)
and ContextAtten (Yu et al. 2018), consisting source and
target dataset respectively. The inpainting is performed to
central 128×128 pixels of the original images.
Baseline methods. We evaluate LAE by comparing it with
six baselines (see more details in supplemental file).
• SuppressNet: A generic manipulation detector (Bayar and
Stamm 2016). An architecture is specifically designed to
adaptively suppress the high-level content of the image.
• ResidualNet: Residual-based descriptors are used for
forgery detection (Cozzolino, Poggi, and Verdoliva 2017).
• StatsNet: This method integrates the computation of sta-
tistical feature extraction within a CNN framework (We
use Stats-2L) (Rahmouni et al. 2017).
• MesoInception: A inception module based Deepfakes de-
tector, where mean square error instead of cross-entropy is
used as loss function (Afchar et al. 2018).
• XceptionNet: A CNN based network, where depth-wise
separable convolution layers with residual connections is
used for forgery detection (Chollet 2017).
• ForensicTransfer: AutoEncoder-based detector is de-
signed to adapt well to novel manipulation methods (Coz-
zolino et al. 2018). For a fair comparison with others, we
use their version that is not fine-tuned on target dataset.
Network architectures. For encoder and decoder, we use a
structure similar to U-net (Ronneberger, Fischer, and Brox
2015). Details about the layers and corresponding output
shapes are given in Tab. 2. The AvgPool2d corresponds to
global average pooling layer, which transform the [512,16,16]
activation layer into 512 dimension vector. After that, we use
a Linear layer to turn it into the 128-dimension latent space
vector z (see Fig. 1). For comparator C(·), we use the 16-
layer version VGGNet (Simonyan and Zisserman 2015), and
the activation after 10-th convolutional layer with output
shape [512,28,28] is used to calculate the perceptual loss. For
discriminator D, we use the standard discriminator network
introduced in DCGAN (Radford, Metz, and Chintala 2016).
Implementation details. The Adam optimizer (Kingma and
Ba 2014) is utilized to optimize these models with betas of
0.9 and 0.999, epsilon set to 10−8, and batch size set as 64.
For all tasks, the learning rate is fixed as 0.001 for the first
stage in Algorithm 1. Later during finetuning, we reduce the
learning rate by one-tenth every 3 epoches. We have tuned
hyperparameters as mentioned in the supplemental material,
Table 3: Detection accuracy on hold-out test set of source dataset
and generalization accuracy on target dataset.
Face Attribute Inpainting
Models Face2face FaceSwap StarGAN Glow G&L ContextAtten
SuppressNet 93.86 50.92 99.98 49.94 99.08 49.98
ResidualNet 86.67 61.54 99.98 49.86 98.96 58.45
StatsNet 92.94 57.74 99.98 50.04 96.17 50.12
MesoInception 94.38 47.32 100.0 50.01 86.90 61.34
XceptionNet 98.02 49.94 100.0 49.67 99.86 50.16
ForensicTransfer 93.91 52.81 100.0 50.08 99.65 50.05
LAE 100 92.14 60.17 98.72 56.17 98.92 54.01
LAE 400 90.93 63.15 95.09 57.01 99.23 54.54
and the following ones work well for all three tasks: α1=1.0,
α2=1.0, β1=1.0, β2=1.0, β3=0.01, λ1=0.5, λ1=1.0. We apply
normalization with mean (0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and standard
deviation (0.229, 0.224, 0.225). Besides, target dataset only
serves testing purposes, and none of images is used to train
model or tune hyperparameters.
Generalization Accuracy Evaluation
For three tasks, detection accuracy on hold-out test set
(source) and data generated by alternative methods (target)
are given in Tab. 3. There are three interesting observations.
Generalization gap. There is a dramatic accuracy gap be-
tween source and target dataset. All baseline methods have
relatively high accuracy on source test set (most of them are
over 90%), while having random classification (around 50%)
on target dataset. Usually the detection performance of mod-
els is calculated using the prediction accuracy on the source
test set. Due to the independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) training-test split of data, especially in the presence of
strong priors, detection model can succeed by simply recog-
nize patterns that happen to be predictive on instances over
the source test set. This is problematic, and source test set
might fail to adequately measure how well detectors perform
on previously unseen inputs (Du et al. 2019).
LAE reduces generalization gap. LAE reduces the gen-
eralization gap by using a small ratio of extra supervision.
LAE 100 and LAE 400 mean the number Nactive is set as
100 and 400 respectively. When using 400 annotations (less
than 1% than total number of training data in Tab. 1), we
achieve state-of-the-art performance on face manipulation
and attribute modification tasks. LAE outperforms best base-
lines by 1.61% and 6.93% respectively on target dataset of
two tasks. Compared to 100 annotations, using 400 anno-
tations has boosted the detection accuracy on target set by
2.98%, 0.84%, and 0.53% respectively. This indicates that
LAE has potential to further promote generalization accuracy
with more annotations.
LAE can be further improved. Despite the accuracy in-
crease on target dataset, there is still generalization gaps. We
assume that the source and target distributions should be
similar for a specific forgery task. But in practice the distri-
bution difference could be very large. The accuracy increase
bound of LAE depends on the distribution difference between
source and target domain. Towards this end, using a small
number of target dataset data to finetune model could possi-
bly further reduce the generalization gap, and this direction
would be explored in our future research.
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Figure 2: Attention map comparison with baselines.
(a) Face2face (b) FaceSwap
Figure 3: Source and target difference via representative heatmaps.
Interpretability Evaluation
For all three forgery detection tasks, we provide case studies
to qualitatively illustrate the effectiveness of the generated
explanation using attention maps shown from Fig. 2.
Comparison with baselines. LAE attention maps are com-
pared with two baselines: MesoInception and XceptionNet,
where the heatmaps for baselines are generated using Grad-
CAM (Selvaraju et al. 2017). The visualization indicates
that LAE has truly grasped the intrinsic patterns encoded in
the forgery part, instead of picking up spurious and unde-
sirable correlation during the training process. For the first
two rows (face manipulation), LAE could focus attention on
eyes, noses, mouths and beards. In contrast, two baselines
mistakenly highlight some background region, e.g., collar
and forehead. For the third and fourth row, LAE correctly
focuses on the inpainted eagle neck and the modified hair
region respectively. By comparison, baselines depends more
on non-forgery part, e.g., wings and eyes to make detection.
Source and target difference. Through attention map visu-
alizations, we observe the distribution difference of source
and target dataset. For example in face manipulation detec-
tion task (see Fig. 3), Face2face mainly changes lips and eye
brows, while FaceSwap changes mostly nose and eyes. This
validates the distribution difference between source and target
dataset and brings challenges to generalization accuracy.
Ablation and Hyperparameters Analysis
We utilize models trained on Deepfake-alike face manipula-
tion task to conduct ablation and hyperparameter analysis to
study the contribution of different components in LAE.
Table 4: Ablation analysis of LAE for face manipulation task.
LAE rec LAE latent LAE latent pixel LAE latent rec LAE
Face2face 50.39 95.82 96.57 96.92 92.14
FaceSwap 49.46 50.70 50.58 50.54 60.17
Table 5: Hyperparameter analysis for β1, β2, β3.
β1 β2 β3 Face2face FaceSwap
Alter pixel 1.0 1.0 0.01 96.92 50.54
0.5 1.0 0.01 96.01 50.86
0.1 1.0 0.01 95.55 50.86
Alter perceptual 1.0 1.0 0.01 96.92 50.54
1.0 0.5 0.01 96.74 50.82
1.0 0.1 0.01 95.84 50.50
Alter adversarial 1.0 1.0 0.1 54.16 49.92
1.0 1.0 0.05 58.28 50.01
1.0 1.0 0.01 96.92 50.54
Ablation analysis. We compare LAE with its ablations to
identify the contributions of different components. Four abla-
tions include: LAE rec, trained only with reconstruction loss
of Eq.(5); LAE latent, using only latent space loss in Eq.(3);
LAE latent pixel, using both latent space loss and pixel loss
in Eq.(5); LAE latent rec, using latent space loss and whole
reconstruction loss. Note that no attention loss is used in the
ablations. The comparison results are given in Tab. 4. There
are several key findings. Firstly, latent space loss is the most
important part, without which even source test set accuracy
could drop to 50.39%. Secondly, all of pixel-wise, perceptual,
and adversarial losses could contribute to performance on
source test set. At the same time, no significant increase is
observed on the target dataset with any combination of these
losses. Thirdly, attention loss based on candidates selected
via active learning could significantly increase generalization
accuracy on target dataset (around 10%).
Hyperparameters analysis. We evaluate the effect of dif-
ferent hyperparameters towards model performance by alter-
ing the values of β1, β2, β3 in Eq.(5) and λ1, λ2 in Eq.(11).
Corresponding results are reported in Tab. 5 (without atten-
tion loss and active learning) and Tab. 6 (with attention loss
and active learning) respectively. The results indicate that
increase of weights for pixel loss and perceptual loss could
enhance model performance on source test set. In contrast,
a small weight for adversarial loss is beneficial for accuracy
improvement. As shown in Tab. 5, fixing λ1 and reducing λ2
from 1.0 to 0.5 then to 0.1 have significantly decreased the
accuracy on target dataset. This confirms the significance of
attention loss in improving generalization accuracy.
Random vs. active learning. For challenging candidate
selection, we have compared random selection with active
learning based selection. The generalization result on target
dataset (FaceSwap) is illustrated in Fig. 4. There is a dramatic
gap between random selection and active learning. For in-
stance, active learning could increase target dataset accuracy
by 9.81% when the annotation number is 100 (< 0.2% of
training data). This indicates that active learning is effective
in terms of selecting challenging candidates.
Forgery ground truth number analysis. We study the ef-
fect of attention regularization by altering the number of
challenging candidates(Nactive) selected by active learning
Table 6: Hyperparameter analysis for λ1, λ2.
λ1 λ2 Face2face FaceSwap
Fix λ1=1.0 1.0 1.0 95.96 55.12
1.0 0.5 96.02 52.54
1.0 0.1 96.08 50.02
Fix λ1=0.5 0.5 1.0 92.14 60.17
0.5 0.5 94.48 56.31
0.5 0.1 95.94 51.02
Fix λ1=0.1 0.1 1.0 91.07 58.17
0.1 0.5 92.67 53.20
0.1 0.1 95.02 50.94
Figure 4: Random and active learning selection comparison. The x
axis denotes annotation number which has pixel-wise masks.
(see Fig. 4). There are two interesting observations. First, in-
creasing the number of annotations typically improves model
generalization, indicating the benefit of extra supervision.
Second, using forgery masks for less than 0.2% of training
data has increased accuracy by 10%. Considering the annota-
tion effort of pixel-wise masks, this advantage of requiring
small ratio of forgery mask annotations is significant.
Conclusions and Future Work
We propose a new forgery detection method, called Locality-
aware AutoEncoder (LAE), to boost the generalization ac-
curacy by making predictions relying on correct forgery evi-
dence. A key characteristic of LAE is the augmented local
interpretability, which could be regularized using extra pixel-
wise forgery masks, in order to learn intrinsic and meaningful
forgery representations. We also present an active learning
framework to reduce the efforts to get forgery masks (less
than 1% of training data). Extensive experiments have been
conducted on three types of forgery detection tasks, includ-
ing DeepFake-alike face manipulation, GAN-based attribute
modification, and images inpainting, to evaluate the perfor-
mance of LAE. Experimental results show that our resulting
models have a higher probability to look at forgery region
rather than unwanted bias and artifacts to make predictions.
Empirical analysis further demonstrates that LAE has supe-
rior generalization performance on data generated by alterna-
tive forgery methods.
Due to the inherent difficulty of the detection problem, we
still could observe generalization gap between source test set
and target dataset that is generated by alternative methods.
Although they are related and belong to the same task, there
remains slight distribution differences between them. Using
transfer learning and other techniques to further reduce this
generalization gap would be explored in our future research.
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